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This is the first study that assesses the economic effects of direct democratic institutions on a 
cross country basis. Its results are based on up to six new measures produced to reflect the 
legislative basis for using direct democratic institutions as well as their factual use. In 
addition, a more general overall indicator is used. On the basis of these two different data sets 
only some of the results of the former intra-country studies are confirmed. An analysis based 
on the more general democracy index for 87 countries shows that a higher degree of direct 
democracy leads to lower budget deficits and higher government effectiveness. The effects on 
government expenditure, corruption and productivity have the expected signs but do not reach 
conventional levels of significance. A more fine grained analysis for a cross section of 88 
countries based on the second data set shows that institutional detail matters a great deal. In 
particular, the mere possibility of drawing on direct-democratic institutions is often not 
sufficient to induce significant effects whereas the frequency of their factual use has a number 
of substantive effects on economic variables. 
JEL Code: H1, H3, H5, H8. 
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The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment 
1  Introduction 
A number of empirical studies have shown that direct democratic institutions have 
significant and robust effects on economic outcomes. Matsusaka (2005, 185ff.) 
sums up the available evidence writing “Direct Democracy Works”. Some other 
recent studies (e.g. Bodmer 2004) have been more reluctant to assign substantial 
effects to direct democratic institutions in general but have hypothesized that it is 
very specific institutions, such as the fiscal referendum, that make the difference. 
Yet, to date all empirical studies have been constrained to analyzing the effects of 
direct democratic institutions within countries, most of these studies dealing either 
with the U.S. or Switzerland. 
Here, we are interested in assessing the economic effects of direct democratic 
institutions on a cross-country basis. This is a timely question as direct democratic 
institutions have been created the world over and are more frequently used than 
ever before: between 1991 and 2004, 517 popular votes on the national level have 
been documented (Institute & Referendum Institute Europe 2005b, 106). 
Although the majority of them were held in Europe (317), the spread of direct 
democracy seems to be a global phenomenon: 85 took place in the Americas, 54 
in Africa, 32 in Asia and 30 in Oceania (ibid.).2 The question could hence be 
rephrased as “does direct democracy work in general” or – probably more to the 
point – “under what conditions does direct democracy work”? 
In their book-length study on the economic effects of constitutions, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) have analyzed the effects of constitutional institutions on a 
number of variables, including (1) fiscal policy, in particular the size of the 
government, the composition of government spending, and the size of the budget 
deficit; (2) rent extraction by the government, in particular the perceived 
corruption of government and the effectiveness with which government provides 
public goods and services; and (3) composite measures of growth-promoting 
policies such as the protection of private property rights that should then be 
reflected in labor as well as total factor productivity. Persson and Tabellini did not 
analyze the effects of direct democratic institutions. But it seems to make sense to 
use their endogenous variables in order to ensure the comparability of our results 
                                                 
2   According to the Search Engine for direct democracy (http://www.sudd.ch), 432 referendums and 
initiatives were observed between 1985 and 1994 the world over. This number increased to 492 in 
the decade from 1995 to 2004.   3
with theirs. We hence decided to use exactly the same endogenous variables here 
as long as there were no compelling reasons for some modification.  
In a first analysis we use a composite indicator to proxy for “direct democracy” 
which is provided by Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) in their paper on determinants of 
direct democracy and contains information on 87 countries. The use of this index 
has advantages, it relies, e.g., not only on the legal foundations but also on 
countries’ experiences with direct democracy, as well as disadvantages, the 
coding is, e.g., rather intransparent. Therefore, we go one step further in a second 
analysis by constructing a number of de jure as well as de facto variables that take 
institutional detail explicitly into account.  
By and large, the results of the first analysis with the index variable are in line 
with the conventional wisdom gained on the basis of intra-country studies. The 
insights gained with regard to Switzerland and the U.S. would make us predict 
that the presence of direct democratic institutions is correlated with lower 
government expenditure, budget deficits and corruption as well as higher 
government effectiveness and a better economic development. In line with these 
expectations, we find that budget deficits are significantly lower and government 
efficiency is higher when direct democratic institutions are strong. With regard to 
government expenditure, corruption and factor productivity, our estimations show 
the expected signs but the regression coefficients do not reach a conventional 
level of significance. 
The results of the second analysis with the extended data set partially confirm and 
extend these results. We do find a significant influence of direct democratic 
institutions on fiscal policy variables, yet we do not find a significant correlation 
between direct democratic institutions and corruption or productivity. Institutional 
detail matters a great deal: the effects hinge on specific institutions. It makes a 
difference whether we talk of initiatives, optional or mandatory referendums. The 
factual use of direct democratic institutions has more significant effects than their 
potential use.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 surveys the empirical 
literature, the following section deals with possible transmission channels through 
which direct democratic institutions could have an impact on economic outcomes, 
section four describes the data and the estimation approach used here. Section 5 
contains the actual estimates and offers some possible interpretations. Section 6 
concludes and suggests a number of questions for further research. The paper   4
focuses, hence, on positive analysis and does not deal with any normative issues 
such as the optimal degree of representation.3 
2  Survey of the Literature 
The authors of the Institute & Referendum Institute Europe (2005b, 228) define 
direct democracy as the right of citizens to directly decide on substantive political 
issues by means of popular votes, i.e. independently of the wishes of the 
government or parliament. They emphasize two implications of that definition: (1) 
direct democracy is to do with decisions on substantive issues – and not on 
people; rights of recall and direct election of mayors and presidents are, hence, not 
part of direct democratic institutions. (2) The independence from the wishes of the 
governing implies that plebiscites which are often used by the governing to have 
their policies reconfirmed are not considered as forming part of direct democratic 
institutions either. 
With regard to the kind of institutions that qualify, referendums are usually 
distinguished from initiatives. The constitution can prescribe the use of 
referendums for passing certain types of legislation. Usually, optional 
referendums are distinguished from obligatory referendums. Here, agenda setting 
powers remain with parliament, but the citizens need to give their consent. 
Initiatives, in turn, allow the citizens to become agenda setters: the citizens 
propose a piece of legislation that will then be decided upon given that they 
manage to secure a certain quorum of votes in favor of the initiative. Initiatives 
can aim at different levels of legislation (constitutional vs. ordinary legislation), 
and their possible scope can vary immensely (some constitutions prohibiting, e.g., 
initiatives on budget-relevant issues). 
In a paper on the effects of direct democratic institutions in Switzerland, Frey 
(1994) argues that there is a “classe politique” that would tend to cartelize against 
the interest of citizens. Given that direct democratic institutions exist, citizens 
have the competence to constrain the power of this cartel. He observes that in 39% 
of the referendums that took place in Switzerland between 1848 and 1990, the 
majority of the population was different from the majority in Parliament (ibid., 
73) which is interpreted as a proof of the hypothesis of a better reflection of 
voters’ preferences via referendums. If one assumes that politicians have an 
incentive not to be corrected by referendums, then they would try to anticipate the 
                                                 
3    For an early discussion of these issues drawing on an economic approach, see Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962, chapter 15 and passim.   5
result of the referendum and vote accordingly. Under this assumption, the number 
of 39% is a truly stunning figure. 
Matsusaka (1995, 2004) has estimated the effects of the right to an initiative on 
fiscal policy among all U.S. states except Alaska. He finds that states that have 
that institution have lower expenditures and lower revenues than states that do not. 
With regard to Switzerland, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) have dealt with the 
effects of a mandatory fiscal referendum on the same variables. They find that 
both expenditure and revenues in cantons with the mandatory referendum are 
lower by about 7 and 11 percent compared to cantons without mandatory 
referendums. Matsusaka (2004, ch. 4) also deals with the question whether 
initiatives have any effect on the distribution of government spending between the 
state and the local level and finds that initiative states spend 13 percent less per 
capita at the state level than non-initiative states but spend 4 percent more on the 
local level. Proponents of direct democracy would interpret this finding as 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that under direct democracy, government 
spending is more in line with the preferences of the citizens. Recently, Bodmer 
(2004) has poured some water into the wine of those arguing that direct 
democratic institutions would substantially reduce government growth by 
showing that during the 1990ies, direct democracy had no effect on spending and 
deficits among the Swiss cantons. 
The next question we are interested in is whether direct democratic institutions 
have any effects on rent extraction, i.e. the perceived level of government 
corruption as well as the efficiency with which public goods are provided. With 
regard to U.S. states, Alt and Lassen (2003) find that initiative states have 
significantly lower levels of perceived corruption than non-initiative states. 
Pommerehne (1983, 1990) dealt with the effects of direct democracy on the 
efficiency with which government services are provided. More specifically, he 
found that waste collection in Swiss towns with both a private contractor and 
direct democratic elements is provided at lowest cost. Some of the cost-
effectiveness is lost when waste collection is provided by the town itself and 
additional efficiency losses materialize if waste collection is provided in towns 
without direct democratic elements. Blomberg et al. (2004) ask whether there is 
any significant difference in the effective provision of public capital between 
initiative and non-initiative states among the 48 continental U.S. states during the 
period from 1969 until 1986. They find that non-initiative states are some 20 
percent less effective in providing public capital than initiative states.   6
Finally, do direct democratic institutions have any discernible effects on 
productivity and thus on per capita income? Feld and Savioz (1997) find that per 
capita GDP in cantons with extended democracy rights is some 5 percent higher 
than in cantons without such rights. 
Frey and his various co-authors argue that one should not only look at the 
outcomes that direct democratic institutions produce, but also at the political 
process they induce (e.g. in Frey and Stutzer 2006). Kirchgässner and Frey (1990) 
speculate that the readiness of voters to incur information costs would, ceteris 
paribus, be higher in democracies with direct-democratic institutions because they 
participate more directly in the decisions (ibid., 63). The authors obviously 
believe their conjecture to be an advantage of direct-democratic institutions. 
Supporters of representative democracy would supposedly claim that this was a 
disadvantage because voters had to incur high information costs. Direct 
democracy would thus be a decision procedure in which resources were wasted 
whereas representative democracy would make use of the welfare enhancing 
principle of the division of labor. Frey and Kirchgässner (ibid. 65) themselves 
emphasize that time is scarce and the number of questions that could usefully be 
decided by referendums was naturally limited in number. 
Smith and Tolbert (2004) are interested in the effects that the initiative might have 
on voting levels, civic engagement and confidence in government. They compare 
initiative with non-initiative U.S. states and find that the frequent use of initiatives 
has positive effects on all three aspects. Benz and Stutzer (2004) have also 
provided evidence in favor of the conjecture that citizens in states with direct-
democratic institutions are better informed than citizens in purely representative 
states. Some European states used referendums to pass the Maastricht treaty 
whereas others did not. Relying on Eurobarometer data, Benz and Stutzer find that 
citizens in countries with a referendum were indeed better informed both 
objectively (i.e. concerning their knowledge about the EU) as well as subjectively 
(i.e. concerning their feeling about how well they were informed). The paper is 
also interesting because it is one of the very few papers that deals with the effects 
of direct-democratic institutions in a cross-country setting. 
3  Some Theory 
In their paper on the effects of direct democratic institutions on total factor 
productivity in Switzerland, Feld and Savioz (1997, 515) argue that due to the 
lack of theoretically convincing transmission channels, it would make sense to opt 
for the large picture, namely to inquire whether the presence of direct-democratic   7
institutions leads to higher total factor productivity.4 In other papers (e.g. 
Matsusaka 2005) three possible transmission channels are rehearsed again and 
again: principal-agent problems, asymmetric information and issue bundling. All 
three will be shortly dealt with in turn. 
In a principal-agent framework, the citizens are the principals who are only very 
imperfectly able to control their agents – namely the government. Direct 
democratic institutions can now have two effects, namely a direct effect which 
enables the principals to override the decisions of unfaithful agents and an indirect 
effect where the threat of drawing on direct-democratic institutions might already 
be sufficient to induce agents to behave according to the preferences of the 
median voter. Potentially, the reduction of the principal agent problem due to the 
existence of direct democratic institutions could affect all of the endogenous 
variables already mentioned in the introduction: if citizens prefer an expenditure 
level that is higher/lower than the government, they should get it via direct-
democratic institutions. It is often assumed that governments prefer higher 
expenditure levels than citizens, in this case, we would expect lower expenditure 
levels the more important direct democratic institutions are in a country. 
But if it could also be the other way round, namely that citizens prefer higher 
expenditure levels than government, we cannot say anything about the sign of the 
coefficient anymore.5 This argument can also be applied to government revenue, 
the budget surplus/deficit, but also the composition of the government budget. But 
if direct democratic institutions can lead to both higher as well as to lower 
government expenditure, we should specify the conditions under which either 
outcome is plausible. It appears reasonable to assume that left-of-center 
governments have a higher propensity to spend than the median voter and that 
right-of-center governments have a lower propensity than the median voter. This 
condition needs, hence, to be controlled for. 
The possible effects of the three direct democratic institutions here under 
consideration can be shown by drawing on a simple spatial model found in both 
Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) as well as in Feld and Matsusaka (2003). The model 
                                                 
4   They write: “…, there seems to be no simple theoretical reason how direct democracy should affect 
economic performance. It seems to be more interesting to analyze the contribution of political 
decision making mechanisms in terms of efficiency. This hints towards the composition of revenue 
and expenditure, the efficiency of the revenue system in terms of tax evasion as well as the 
efficiency of the provision of public services.” 
5   Matsusaka (2000) finds that during the first half of the 20th century, voters in the U.S. initiative 
states were frequently fiscally less conservative than their elected representatives.   8
is based on the assumption that government wants to spend more than the median 
voter which can be motivated by the fiscal commons argument à la Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962). The nice thing about this model is that it enables us to compare 
the effects of various institutions. Call 0 the status quo expenditure level, the ideal 
point of the median voter is indicated by M and that of the (median member of) 
parliament by P. Under purely representative democracy (institutional setting 1), 
parliament will implement its most preferred spending level. This spending 
reduces the utility level of the median voter: the spending level 2M makes him 
indifferent between the status quo and 2M, spending level in excess of 2M thus 
lead to a lower utility level. Given that parliament needs to get the budget 
approved by the population (mandatory referendum; institutional setting 2) the 
voters would reject any proposal that would make them worse off than under the 
status quo. Parliament anticipates this and proposes a budget that will not be 
rejected which means that it will be very close to the level 2M. How do results 
change if the referendum is not mandatory but optional, i.e. voters have to collect 
signatures in favor of a referendum which is, of course, costly? If parliament 
knows the costs (which is assumed here), this third institutional setting enables 
parliament to spend more than under mandatory referendum. The difference in 
spending between these two institutional settings is exactly the amount of costs 
the voters have to incur for collecting the signatures necessary for having an 
optional referendum. This is expenditure level 2M+C in the graph. 
The last institutional setting to be introduced is the initiative. The crucial point 
here is that agenda setting changes from parliament to the population at large. If it 
ever comes to an initiative, spending level M would be realized. Kicking off an 
initiative is, however, not costless either and an initiative will only take place if 
there is a net gain to the voters after having taken the costs (K) into account. The 
higher the percentage of the voters who need to consent to an initiative the higher 
K. Parliament can avoid an initiative by proposing a spending level M+K. 
If we assume that the costs of collecting the signatures for an initiative K are 
smaller than the increase in the expenditure level preferred by the median voter 
(i.e. smaller than the axial sections 0M and M2M), we can rank order spending 
levels as “representative democracy” > “optional referendum” > “mandatory 
referendum”> “initiative”.   9
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Of course, the ideal points need not to be ordered in the way assumed here. It 
might, e.g., be the case that the ideal spending level of a conservative parliament 
is lower than that of the median voter. This would still imply that direct 
democratic institutions lead to outcomes that are closer to the preference of the 
median voter than purely representative institutions.6 But the possibility that the 
population at large wants higher spending levels than the median member of 
parliament should be taken into account explicitly. 
The problem of asymmetric information is often mentioned as an argument 
against direct democracy. The argument basically reads that in order to make 
welfare enhancing policy choices, those choosing need a certain level of 
information. Elected representatives would simply have more or better 
information at their disposal and would thus make better policy choices then the 
citizens at large. 
Effective legislation needs to be in tune with real problems real people are 
confronted with. It is often argued that the common law has an advantage over 
civil law in this regard because the law is constantly developed by judges whose 
agenda is set by plaintiffs and their lawyers. The argument thus is that common 
law is closely adapted to real problems because it constantly produces signals 
from below demanding its adaptation to a changed environment. It could now be 
argued that especially the initiative has similar effects: citizens who believe that 
legislation could be improved kick off an initiative. By way of analogy, it could 
be argued that they, too, provide information on potential ways to improve 
legislation from below. 
                                                 
6   Relying on a three actor model (a representative, an interest group and a voter), Matsusaka and 
McCarty (2001) show that when uncertainty over voter preference is introduced, there are 
parameter constellations under which the (median) voter is worse off under a mixture of direct-
representative institutions than under pure representative democracy. The intuition is that the threat 
of the interest group to kick off a referendum might move the representative’s choice away from 
the voter’s ideal point – which is not known with certainty ex ante.   10
Another way to deal with the issue of asymmetric information is to question 
whether representatives are a priori always better informed than citizens. The 
consequences of policy choices are never completely certain and frequently, 
unexpected side effects unravel. The existence of direct democratic institutions 
can help to induce more intensive discussions during which new arguments are 
developed. As a consequence, it is predicted that both citizens and their 
representatives are better informed when direct democratic institutions are used in 
addition to representative democracy. Furthermore, under direct democratic 
institutions, representatives will often discuss single issues with their voters; they 
have more incentives to be informed than under purely representative democracy. 
There is empirical evidence that citizens living under direct democratic 
institutions are indeed better informed than those not living under them. We are, 
however, unaware of any evidence with regard to the general level of information 
that representatives have at their disposal in the two forms of democracy here 
under consideration. 
A more standard reply to deal with the issue of asymmetric information is to 
propose to constrain the use of direct democratic institutions to situations in which 
there are not “true” or “false” choices, i.e. to situations in which fundamental 
values are at stake (see, e.g., Matsusaka 2005, 193f.). Here, it is preferences that 
count and not superior information. 
We now turn to issue (un-)bundling. Given that different actors have different 
intensities in their preferences concerning various issues, the bundling of issues – 
also called log-rolling - can ideally make many actors better off and additional 
welfare benefits can be reaped. Empirically, it remains, however, heavily disputed 
if log-rolling is not systematically misused in order to realize spending levels far 
beyond the optimal level of the median voter (Mueller 2003, 104-27 sums up both 
the theoretical as well as the empirical evidence). If this is the case, then the 
unbundling of issues can potentially be welfare enhancing. This argument need 
not be confined to fiscal policy: if direct democratic institutions prevent 
politicians from an inefficient bundling of issues, this could also increase 
government effectiveness and labor as well as total factor productivity. 
Until now, the theoretical arguments have closely followed the prevailing 
literature in which two aspects, namely (i) tax evasion and (ii) government 
corruption have played a minor role at best. With regard to tax evasion, the 
argument that direct democratic institutions improve the process of collective 
decision-making (as opposed to its results) that has been stressed by Frey and his 
co-authors becomes relevant: if citizens believe that they have a say in collective   11
decision-making, this increases the legitimacy of the political system. If citizens 
view the political system as “their” system, the readiness to accept its decisions 
will be higher. This could translate into a lower propensity to cheat on taxes. 
High levels of government corruption are often seen as the result of low 
transparency of the collective decision-making process as well as low 
accountability of politicians for the results of their actions. Higher levels of 
transparency would, hence, be correlated with lower corruption levels. The 
transparency of the political process is argued to be higher under direct 
democratic institutions, at least with regard to the issues that could potentially be 
subject to a referendum or an initiative: decision-making will be subject to public 
debate and it will be more difficult to hide corrupt practices from the voters.7 
We are also interested in how institutions affect income. Given that public goods 
are provided more efficiently and that corruption levels are lower, this should also 
be reflected in labor productivity. But ex ante, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that direct democracy impacts on economic variables in ways still different from 
those explicitly mentioned here. If this is a possibility, then direct democratic 
institutions could have an effect on both labor as well as on total factor 
productivity even though they have no relevant effect on the other endogenous 
variables. 
In the introduction, the question was raised whether certain conditions can be 
named that need to be given if direct democracy is to have any effects. In 
countries with feeble institutions of representative democracy, direct democratic 
institutions could be expected to matter more than in countries with strong 
institutions of representative democracy given that direct democratic institutions 
can factually be used. Additionally, it has been conjectured (Kaufmann et al. 
2005, 179) that direct democracy will only work if the country has functioning 
media and the state operates under the rule of law. The media seem to be 
important for direct democracy as much of the discussion concerning the issues 
that the population will decide by way of popular vote will take place there. If the 
media are government-run or government-controlled, serious discussion seems 
unlikely. We will try to control for these factors in the empirical section. 
                                                 
7   It could be argued that the institutional possibility to kick out specific politicians by way of direct 
democratic institutions after they have proven to be corrupt could be an even more relevant check 
on corruption. An empirical test of this hypothesis is left to future work though.   12
4  Data Description and Estimation Approach 
Feld and Matsusaka (2003, 2706) notice that “many studies combine several 
institutional features into an ad hoc index of direct democracy” and point out that 
this does not allow to answer questions concerning the institutional details that 
possibly affect economic outcomes. This is why we propose to look at single 
aspects of direct democratic institutions in the second part of our empirical 
analysis. Yet, in order to ascertain whether direct democratic institutions have any 
clear-cut effects at all, it appears completely straightforward to begin with an 
index. 
 
The Direct Democracy Index (DDI) 
In the first part of our empirical analysis, we therefore rely on the “Direct 
Democracy Index (DDI)” as provided by Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) in their 
paper on determinants of direct democracy. The index draws on three sources: 
Kaufman (2004) for 43 European countries, Hwang (2005) for 33 Asian countries 
and Madroñal (2005) for 17 Latin American countries. Kaufmann (2004) proposes 
a country-rating into seven categories.8 Each country is classified as: 1) radical 
democrat; 2) progressive; 3) cautious; 4) hesitant; 5) fearful; 6) beginner and, 
finally, 7) authoritarian. Hwang (2005) and Madroñal (2005), instead, use a four-
category ranking, and Fiorino and Ricciuti have re-ranked these countries into the 
7 previous categories with 7 being the countries rated as radical democrats, and 1 
the countries with the lowest level of direct democracy. The index is documented 
in appendix 2. 
This index has definite advantages and disadvantages: an advantage of the index 
is that it relies not only on the legal foundations of direct democracy in a given 
country but also on the de facto performance. This means that this indicator 
should not be subject to the fallacy of putting too much trust in the formal legal 
rules of a country. A second advantage is that the general relevance of direct 
democratic institutions in a country is measured, i.e. both the national as well as 
sub-national levels are explicitly taken into account. A definitive disadvantage is 
that the criteria used for weighing the different criteria remain completely opaque 
and that it does not tell anything on the relevance of institutional details (e.g. 
differences between referendums and initiatives).  
                                                 
8   The index is based on four different categories: very fundamental, fundamental, important, and 
useful elements of direct democracy; the complete list of criteria can be found in the appendix 1.   13
A desideratum for the second part of our research hence almost suggests itself: 
generate a database with transparent coding criteria for institutional details of 
direct democracy. Former studies on the economic effects of (constitutional) 
institutions have shown time and again that it is primarily their factual use that 
induces effects – and not their legal foundation. This is why the variables of our 
own coding for 88 countries are grouped into de jure variables on the one hand, 
and de facto variables on the other.9 The effect induced by the de jure institutions 
can also be called “indirect effect” and the one induced by de facto institutions 
“direct effect” as discussed in the theoretical section referring to the principal 
agent problem. In both groups, three variables form the core of our study. We 
begin by presenting the three de jure variables. 
The de jure variables 
REF_MAND is a variable that is coded 1 if the country knows mandatory 
referendums on the national level and 0 otherwise. Coding relies on both national 
constitutions and ordinary legislation. 
REF_OPT is a variable that is coded 1 if the laws of the country provide for the 
possibility of optional referendums and 0 otherwise. Optional referendums are 
initiated by collecting signatures from among the population. If a non-mandatory 
referendum is initiated by government, it is not counted as a referendum here, but 
as a plebiscite. 
INIT is a variable that is coded 1 if the country’s laws allow for the possibility of 
initiatives and 0 otherwise. 
Information on these variables was collected by drawing on primary as well as 
secondary sources. As primary sources we analyzed both the constitutions of the 
covered countries as well as their laws. As secondary sources, we relied on 
country reports issued by the “Initiative and Referendum Institute” (IRI) and 
“Democracy International”. More specifically, data on Europe were taken from 
IRI’s “Guide to Direct Democracy 2004”, on Asia as well as Oceania from “IRI 
Asia”, on Latin America from Democracy International’s “Direct Democracy in 
Latin America” and on North America from national sources. Since no collection 
of country reports on Africa was available, no African country is covered in this 
study. 
                                                 
9   Additional potentially relevant distinctions include whether the direct democratic institutions can be 
used on the national level or (only) on sub-national levels and whether certain policy areas are 
entirely exempt from directly democratic votes.   14
The de facto variables 
If our theoretical priors were correct, then the mere possibility of using direct 
democratic instruments could already have important effects on the behavior of 
politicians. It can, however, not be excluded that our theoretical priors are not 
entirely correct. It could, e.g., be the case that politicians do not correctly 
anticipate the preferences expressed in factually held referendums or initiatives. In 
that case, direct democratic institutions could have a strong effect only if factually 
used. The de facto variables are supposed to reflect the factual use of our three 
institutions over the period 1996 to 2005. It seems reasonable not to assume a 
linear relationship between the number of factually used referendums or initiatives 
and the realized degree of direct democracy. This is why we grouped all countries 
into four groups according to this scheme: 
0 = no factually observed direct democracy (i.e. no factual use between 1996 and 
2005); 
1 = low level of factually observed direct democracy (i.e. one or two votes); 
2 = medium level of factually observed direct democracy (i.e. three to five votes); 
3 = high level of direct democracy (i.e. more than five votes). 
Based on this coding, the following variables were constructed: 
REF_MAND_NUMB_GROUP is the group that a country belongs to based on the 
number of mandatory referendums that took place between 1996 and 2005. 
REF_OPT_NUMB_GROUP is the group that a country belongs to based on the 
number of optional referendums that took place between 1996 and 2005. 
INIT_NUMB_GROUP is the group that a country belongs to based on the number 
of initiatives that took place between 1996 and 2005. 
In addition to the sources already mentioned with regard to the de jure indicators, 
two databanks were used to construct the de facto indicators: the Research Engine 
for Direct Democracy that can be found on the pages of the Swiss Federal 
Institute for Technology in Zurich and the databank provided by the Research 
Center on Direct Democracy at the University of Geneva. 
There are a host of other variables that would also be interesting to use 
(Kaufmann 2004, 179 ff. provides an overview). The majorities needed to get a 
referendum passed differ. Different countries use different quorums that need to 
be met before the result of referendums are binding. The time spans within which 
a certain number of signatures need to be collected differ and so on. All these   15
variables would be very interesting. Only some of them will be used here as it is 
cumbersome to collect the relevant data. We refrain from describing most of the 
other independent variables as well as the dependent variables in any detail here. 
Their exact definitions as well as their sources are documented in appendix 3 and 
4. 
Descriptive Statistics 
In order to get a first feeling for the prevalence of direct democratic institutions 
around the world, the first table shows how many countries out of the entire 
sample explicitly mention direct democratic institutions in their legal frameworks. 
Table 1: An overview over de jure institutions 
Direct democratic institutions 
and plebiscites 
Variable Percentage  of  countries 





Referendum REF 46.6%  88 
Mandatory Referendum  REF_MAND  38.6%  88 
Optional Referendum  REF_OPT  20.5%  88 
Initiative INIT  17.0%  88 
Plebiscite PLEB  64.8%  88 
Parliamentary plebiscites  PLEB_LEG  38.6%  88 
 
The table shows that plebiscites are quite common: almost two thirds of all states 
taken into account here have them. Among those institutions in line with our 
delineation of direct democracy, mandatory referendums are encountered most 
frequently whereas initiatives are encountered least frequently. The bivariate 
correlations among the three core direct democratic institutions show that 
initiatives and optional referendums are very highly correlated (0.82), whereas the 
correlation between mandatory referendums and optional referendums (0.23) as 
well as between mandatory referendums and initiatives (0.32) are a lot lower, 
although they are still significant on the 5%-level. 
Table 2 offers some descriptive statistics on the factual use of direct democratic 
institutions. All maxima in the table are due to Switzerland (the individual country 
codings of all variables can be found in appendix 3). Looking at the last two lines 
of the table, it becomes evident that direct democracy is a rather young trend: on 
average, the legal foundations were only passed some 17 years ago, in many 
countries, direct democratic institutions have, hence, not reached legal age yet.   16
With regard to the last two lines, it is further noteworthy that there usually is some 
implementation lag: on average, the first actual experience with direct democracy 
occurs more than five years after creating the legal foundations. 
 
 
Table 2: An overview over de facto institutions 
Description of 
the Variable 




Max. Min. #  of 
obs
# Ref. 1996-2005  REF_NUMB  0 - X  0.88  4.31  39.00  0.00 88 
# mandatory ref. 1996-2005  REF_MAND_NUMB  0 - X  0.49  2.04  17.00  0.00 88 
Grouped # mandatory ref. 
1996-2005 
REF_MAND_NUMB_GROUP 0-3 0.23  0.58  3.00  0.00 88 
# opt. ref. 1996-2005  REF_OPT_NUMB  0 - X  0.39  2.47  22.00  0.00 88 
Grouped # opt. ref. 1996-
2005 
REF_OPT_NUMB_ GROUP  0-3 0.10  0.50  3.00  0.00 88 
# initiatives 1996-2005  INIT_NUMB  0 - X  0.41  2.12  19.00  0.00 88 
Grouped # initiatives 
1996-2005 
INIT_NUMB_ GROUP  0-3  0.16  0.52  3.00  0.00 88 
(# mand. ref.)/(# all ref.)  REF_MAND_PROP  0 – 1  0.16  0.36  1.00  0.00 88 
(# opt. ref.)/(# all ref.)  REF_OPT_PROP  0 – 1  0.03  0.16  1.00  0.00 88 
# years since first factual 
use of ref or initiative 
YEARS_DEMINST_ 
USED 
0 – X  11.63 29.07  158.00  0.00 88 
# years since legal ancho-
ring of ref. or initiative 
YEARS_DEMINST_ 
SET 
0 – X  17.14 31.12  158.00  0.00 88 
 
Bivariate Correlations 
Before presenting the multivariate estimation approach, we report bivariate 
correlations in order to get an idea what the determinants of direct democracy 
could be and whether direct democratic institutions are empirically used as 
complements or rather as substitutes to other political institutions. Federalism is, 
e.g., one approach to make politics more transparent and politicians more directly 
accountable to their constituents. A high correlation would thus point at a 
complementary function of direct democratic institutions and a low correlation at 
a substitutive one. Table 3 reveals that most of the correlations between the de 
jure variables and other country characteristics are quite weak. This is also the 
case with regard to the correlation between common law and direct democratic   17
institutions. In the theoretical section, it was conjectured that both the common 
law and direct democratic institutions could be a means of signaling demands to 
modify legislation. The negative coefficient could indicate that the two tend to be 
used as substitutes rather than complements but the correlation never reaches 
conventional significance levels. 
One exception is the correlation with the share of legislators elected in national 
districts. The conjecture motivating the inclusion of this variable is that 
transparency of what the legislators do and subsequently their accountability to 
the constituents are supposed to be higher if only a small share is elected in 
national districts (and also if district magnitude is small). The correlation observed 
here suggests that the direct democratic institutions are employed as a potential 
correction mechanism of the low accountability induced by the high share of 
legislators elected on the national level. 
Table 3: Correlations between direct democracy and other country characteristics 
Correlations: 
bivariate, Bravais-Pearson 
Variable  Mandatory 
referendum
Optional  
referendum  Initiative DDI 
Federalism 
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**, * show that correlation is significantly different from zero on the 1 or 5 percent level, respectively.  
 
The correlations with the Direct Democracy Index (last column of table 3) are 
somewhat different. This might be due to two differences with the de jure 
indicators: DDI also takes the factual use of direct democratic institutions into   18
account and does this, moreover, not only on the national but also on the local 
level. It seems that states with strong direct-democratic institutions are more likely 
to come along with parliamentary than with presidential systems. As the 
combination between majority rule and presidential system was found to have 
huge effects (e.g. on the fiscal policy of a state, in Persson and Tabellini), it is 
particularly interesting to ask whether strong direct democratic institutions can 
work as a corrective device in states that have a combination of parliamentary 
systems with proportional rule. 
The variable “first year of democratic rule” indicates the first year in which a 
country has been rated as democratic and has remained so without interruption 
until today. It could be conjectured that higher levels of direct democracy enable 
countries to better implement democracy in general. If this was the case we would 
see a negative coefficient which is indeed the case. Alternatively, we have tested 
the correlation between the age of the current constitution and the indicator of 
direct democracy. The negative coefficient means that the older the constitution, 
the higher the degree of direct democracy. This is somewhat of a surprise given 
that the notions of more direct citizen participation seem to have developed rather 
recently. 
More generally, direct democratic institutions could be expected to go hand in 
hand with more democratic regimes and higher levels of freedom.10 This is indeed 
the case and the correlation is the highest in the entire table. We further tested 
whether there is a correlation between the factual independence of a country’s 
judiciary and its direct democratic institutions, the two are uncorrelated. Finally, 
one could expect people in countries with a high degree of direct democracy to be 
happier than those who only enjoy low degrees of direct democracy. This does not 
seem to be the case. 
A closer look at potential determinants of the factual use of direct democratic 
institutions (table 4) shows that the longer the period that has passed since the 
institutions were first introduced (or they were used for the first time), the more 
intensively they are used today (i.e. between 1996 and 2005). Excluding 
Switzerland leads only to a moderate reduction in the correlations. This seems to 
confirm the conjecture that citizens first need to learn how to use these 
institutions. 
                                                 
10   The Gastil-Index used here is a combination of the two indicators that distinguish between political 
freedom and civil liberties. It thus covers a broad concept of freedom. We recoded it from 1 (least 
democratic) to 7 (most democratic).    19
Table 4: Correlations of factual use of direct democracy and institutional characteristics 
Direct Democratic Institutions  Correlations: 
bivariate, Bravais-Pearson 
# of mand. ref. # of opt. ref.  # of initiatives
































Quorum 2 (Minimum „yes“ votes for being binding; 




**, * show that correlation is significantly different from zero on the 1 or 5 percent level, respectively. 
 
In many states, some policy areas are explicitly excluded from being subjected to 
referendums (e.g. basic constitutional rights, international treaties). Supposedly, 
the most frequently encountered constraint is that referendums are not allowed to 
have any budgetary consequences. A simple conjecture would be that the higher 
the number of excluded policy areas, the lower the number of factually held 
referendums and initiatives. Table 4 shows that all correlations have the expected 
sign but do not reach conventional significance levels. A significant correlation 
does, however, exist between the number of policy areas in which referendums 
are obligatory (e.g. constitutional changes) and the intensity of using direct 
democratic institutions. The correlation becomes somewhat weaker if Switzerland 
is excluded but remains significant on the 5 percent level. Another conjecture is 
also straightforward: the higher the percentage of signatures that need to be 
collected before an initiative (or an optional referendum) takes place, the less 
likely are they to factually take place. Both observed correlations do not contradict 
this conjecture, but note that the number of observations is fairly low.11 The next 
hurdle that needs to be mastered before optional referendums and initiatives can 
unfold any consequences is the quorum that is the minimum level of electoral 
participation that needs to be met for the referendum (the initiative) to be binding. 
Higher quorums can have discouraging effects on even trying to use direct 
                                                 
11   It is remarkable that the number of signatures that are required before direct democratic institutions 
can be used are frequently not part of the constitution but of ordinary legislation. This means that 
the signature requirement is a tool that can be used by government actors to influence the intensity 
with which direct democratic institutions are factually used.   20
democratic institutions in the first place.12 All correlations have indeed a negative 
sign indicating that the conjecture cannot be rejected. Note again the small 
number of observations.  
The Estimation Approach 
The estimation approach used is straightforward and follows directly from the 
theoretical part. We are interested in estimating the dependent variable Y that can 
stand for (i) fiscal policy, (ii) government effectiveness or (iii) economic 
productivity of a country. The vector M is made up of the variables used by 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) to explain Y. The variable DD is either the Direct 
Democracy Index or one of our measures of direct democratic institutions from 
the extended data set. The Z vector is composed of a number of additional control 
variables and εi is an error term.  
                                      Yi = αi + βMi + γDDi + δZi + εi 
Compared to intra-country studies, cross-country studies pose a number of 
problems that one should at least be aware of. In intra-country studies, the ceteris 
paribus condition is often a lot better satisfied than in cross-country studies: many 
factors that differ across countries can be safely assumed not to display large 
degrees of variation within countries. This means that the number of control 
variables used in cross-country studies should be higher than in intra-country 
studies. Beyond the Persson and Tabellini variables in the M-vector, we therefore 
also tested for additional variables in the Z-vector. We use a proxy for the size of 
coalition governments in terms of independent actors, the “index of political 
cohesion” variable, based on the conjecture that larger coalition governments 
would tend to pass larger budgets (Roubini and Sachs 1989). The source used here 
is the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2000). It has been argued that 
direct democracy would only be relevant in certain more general environments in 
which governments generally adhere to the rule of law, the press can freely 
criticize government etc. This is why we also included variables proxying for 
Press Freedom (Freedom House), the Rule of Law (Heritage Foundation) as well 
as a Political Conflict Index (Banks 2004). The Political Conflict Index is 
composed of eight single variables, namely the number of assassinations, the 
number of general strikes, the occurrence of guerilla warfare, the occurrence of 
                                                 
12   The same consideration should be true with regard to the majorities needed to make the outcome 
of a referendum or an initiative binding. Yet, empirically, we do not find any variation in the needed 
majorities: it is always simple majorities that are needed. There is, hence, no empirical evidence with 
which the conjecture could be tested.   21
government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government 
demonstrations. We also include legal origins as a control variable. 
Further, two measures were used to control for the fiscal or ideological 
preferences of the electorate: the first one measures the degree of fiscal 
conservatism of the voters. The second one reflects ideological preferences of 
legislative and executive majorities. The first measure is taken from the World 
Values Survey. There are two variables, one aiming at the self-evaluation of the 
surveyed person, the other aiming at his or her normative ideal for the entire 
society.13 The second measure is taken from Whytock (2006) who coded political 
party affiliations of the executive and legislative branches according to the 
following scheme: -1 if both the executive branch and legislative branch are right-
leaning ideologically, (with the negative sign implying lower expected 
government spending) and 1 if both the executive and the legislative branch are 
left-leaning (and 0 otherwise). 
All the estimates presented in the next section are, however, robust to the 
inclusion of all of these variables of the Z-vector, if not mentioned otherwise. In 
addition, all estimates are robust to the exclusion of outliers whose residuals are 
larger than two standard deviations.14 
Models in which institutional variables serve as explanatory variables are always 
subject to serious endogeneity issues. We believe that these issues are particularly 
relevant with regard to government effectiveness and the economy’s productivity. 
The so-called Lipset hypothesis (1960) assumes that the level of economic 
development of a country has a direct effect on its likelihood to be democratic. 
Hence, all regressions are estimated by OLS in the first place and a Hausman-Test 
is conducted to check for endogenity. Identification of adequate instruments for 
the Hausman-Test is difficult as the theory treating direct democratic institutions 
as endogenous is in its very infancy. This is why we have opted for a very 
pragmatic approach: We draw on a paper by Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) who 
identify a number of variables that have a significantly positive effect on the level 
of direct democracy in a cross section of 87 countries, namely the latitude as 
instrument for per capita income, the level of education (we will use primary and 
                                                 
13   Here is the wording of the two questions: In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the 
right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (Left Right 1-10); And 
now, could you please tell me which type of society your country should aim to be in the future. 
For each pair of statements, would you prefer being closer to the first or to the second alternative? 
A society with extensive social welfare, but high taxes. A society where taxes are low and individuals 
take responsibility for themselves. (somewhat closer to, on a scale 1-5). 
14   All estimates available upon request from the corresponding author.   22
secondary school enrollment), the stability of political rights (we will use age of 
democracy) and the share of Catholics among the  population. The degree of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization has a negative impact according to their 
findings.15 These five instruments explain 60 percent of the cross country 
variation of the DDI. None of the estimates presented in the next section is subject 
to serious endogeneity bias according to the Hausman-Test and we refrain from 
running TSLS in addition to OLS. 
Additionally, a number of interaction effects between the proxies for direct 
democracy and press freedom, the rule of law, the level of education and de facto 
judicial independence were analyzed. The effects proved, however, insignificant 
and we do not report them here. This is entirely different with regard to the 
interaction between the proxies for direct democracy and the observed level of 
democracy. We were interested in the question whether direct democratic 
institutions have stronger effects in weaker democracies and constructed a dummy 
coded 1 for countries with a Gastil-Index of 4 and less.16 17 out of the 62 
countries recognized in most regressions belong to the group of “weak 
democracies”. The results of the interaction effects are reported below. 
 
5  Estimation Results and their Interpretation 
Fiscal Policy Variables 
We now move on to describe the estimation results with regard to fiscal policy 
variables. These include (i) total government expenditure, (ii) central government 
expenditure, (iii) central government revenue, (iv) budget surplus, and (v) 
composition of government spending. Empirical studies from Switzerland and the 
U.S. have usually found that the stronger the institutions of direct democracy, the 
lower the government expenditure, but also government revenue and the budget 
deficit. The picture that we get from the cross-country analysis points into the 
same direction but is not nearly as clear-cut as that from the former studies: The 
effect of the DDI for explaining differences in total government expenditure has 
the expected sign but does not reach conventional levels of significance.17 A 
                                                 
15   Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) find similar results with regard to the general level of democracy in a 
country. 
16   Remember that we recoded the Gastil such that lower values indicate lower levels of democracy. 
17   It appears plausible to assume that the fiscal referendum is crucial for direct democratic institutions 
to have expenditure decreasing effects. The fiscal referendum forces governments to ask the 
citizens for approval of their budget proposals. As the proxy for direct democracy used here does 
not include a variable specifically geared at the existence of fiscal referendums, empirical testing of 
this potentially relevant transmission mechanism needs to be explored in future studies.   23
similar result is obtained when central government expenditure or revenue is used 
as the dependent variable. We, hence, refrain from documenting the results. 
Among the six variables on institutional details estimated here (three de jure and 
three  de facto institutions), only the existence of mandatory referendums is 
significantly correlated with total government expenditure: states that have 
mandatory referendums have expenditures that are some 3.4% of GDP lower than 
states that do not. 
We were interested to know whether the effects of direct democratic institutions 
only materialize in countries that have already achieved a high level of democracy 
– or whether they materialize independently of the general level of democracy. In 
order to test this, we constructed a dummy variable “weak democracy” that takes 
on the value of 1 if the Gastil-coding was smaller than four. This dummy was 
interacted with the direct democracy variables. The size of the coefficient for 
mandatory referendums more than doubles (to 7.2) and the direct effect of both 
mandatory referendums and initiatives becomes significant now. A one-group 
improvement in mandatory referendums would lead to lower total government 
expenditure of some 8% of GDP! The size of the coefficient for initiatives is still a 
very noteworthy 5.2%. What is stunning: it has a positive sign, i.e. the higher the 
number of factually held initiatives, the higher total government expenditure! It 
seems plausible to assume that well-organized lobby groups are able to take the 
direct democratic institutions hostage for their own agenda.18 
                                                 
18    As an aside, it seems noteworthy that the original “Persson-Tabellini variables” (i.e. form of 
government and electoral system) are frequently not robust to the inclusion of direct democratic 
variables. In another paper (Blume et al. 2007) that replicates and extends on their findings, it is 
shown that form of government is sensitive to marginal changes whereas the effects of electoral 
systems appear more robust.   24
Table 5: Direct Democracy and Total Government Expenditure 
Dependent Variable: 
TOTEXP  Direct Democracy measure used 
Independent Variables 








4.90 2.86 4.33 4.27 4.66 4.39 4.20 
Age of  Democracy (AGE, 0-1) 
(4.89) (3.23) (3.61) (3.49) (3.33) (3.43) (3.51) 
-5.69*** -8.17*** -7.22*** -7.30*** -7.78*** -7.42*** -7.27***  GDP per capita 1990 in log form 
(LYP)  (2.12) (2.28) (2.40) (2.41) (2.35) (2.46) (2.40) 
0.03  0.05** 0.04** 0.04** 0.05** 0.04** 0.04**  Sum of Exports and 
Imports/GDP (TRADE)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
-0.39 -0.02 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.19  % of Population between 15 and 
64 years of age (PROP1564)  (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.30) (0.29) 
1.11***  0.95** 0.95** 0.93**  1.07***  1.01** 0.94**  % of Population above the age of 
65 (PROP65)  (0.42) (0.36) (0.38) (0.39) (0.36) (0.38) (0.40) 
0.84 1.29 1.31 1.27 1.40 1.18 1.31  Gastil-Index (GASTIL, 1-7, 7 = 
highest degree of freedom)  (1.26) (1.20) (1.24) (1.25) (1.19) (1.25) (1.24) 
2.69 3.59**  3.57* 3.60*  4.14**  3.75* 3.58*  Federalism (FEDERAL, 1 = 
federal)  (2.12) (1.69) (1.82) (1.85) (1.96) (1.90) (1.87) 
-11.02*** -7.61**  -8.98**  -8.56*  -9.04** -8.54** -8.74**  OECD-Membership (OECD, 1 = 
OECD-Member)  (3.50) (3.73) (4.23) (4.39) (3.87) (4.00) (4.17) 
0.47 2.94 1.84 1.77 2.18 2.35 1.78  Form of Government (PRES, 1 = 
presidential system)  (2.59) (2.15) (2.17) (2.20) (2.16) (2.29) (2.21) 
0.83 1.16 1.24 1.21 1.02 1.19 1.25  Electoral system (MAJ, 1 = 
plurality rule)  (2.05) (1.29) (1.43) (1.42) (1.44) (1.43) (1.42) 
-0.64  -3.41**  -0.20 0.50 -1.62 -0.97 0.17  Direct Democracy measure (see 
above)  (0.49) (1.34) (1.68) (1.97) (1.00) (0.69) (1.30) 
Constant  81.59 68.67 71.11 71.64 73.79 71.05 71.53 
               
Adjusted R²  0.50  0.55  0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 
SER  5.43 5.27 5.55 5.55 5.44 5.52 5.55 
Jarque-Bera Value  0.46  0.39 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Hausman-Test  (p-value)  0.71        
Observations  59 62 62 62 62 62 62 
*, ** und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses are the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. The Hausman-Test draws on the 
instruments latitude, school enrollment, age of democracy, share of catholic population and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. 
Exclusion of the six countries that introduced direct democratic institutions after 1996 leads to very similar results. On average, 
the adj. R-square is some three to four points higher (results available upon request). 
 
The effects of direct democratic institutions on the budget surplus (which 
frequently takes on a negative sign and could, hence, also be called budget deficit) 
are slightly different which is why they are presented in table 6.   25
Table 6: Direct Democracy and Budget Surplus 
Dependent Variable:  
SPL  Direct Democracy measure used 
Independent Variables 








-3.42 -3.29 -3.47 -3.21  -4.44*  -3.48 -3.30  Initial Endebtment (INIT_ 
DEBT)  (2.42) (2.04) (2.27) (2.10) (2.40) (2.42) (2.09) 
-0.09 -1.09 -1.87 -1.39 -1.32 -1.63 -2.00 
Age of  Democracy (AGE, 0-1) 
(2.20) (1.83) (1.89) (1.68) (1.78) (1.81) (1.67) 
4.20*** 3.68*** 3.58*** 3.55*** 3.76*** 3.74*** 3.93***  GDP per capita 1990 in log form 
(LYP)  (1.22) (1.31) (1.25) (1.27) (1.23) (1.28) (1.20) 
0.02*  0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**  Sum of Exports and 
Imports/GDP (TRADE)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
-0.27*  -0.25 -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.24 -0.26  % of Population between 15 and 
64 years of age (PROP1564)  (0.16) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
-0.53**  -0.43* -0.43* -0.45* -0.43* -0.49*  -0.52**  % of Population above the age of 
65 (PROP65)  (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) 
0.17 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 0.05  0.08  Gastil-Index (GASTIL, 1-7, 7 = 
highest degree of freedom)  (0.60) (0.58) (0.49) (0.51) (0.53) (0.54) (0.51) 
-1.07 -1.42 -1.19 -1.32  -1.67*  -1.48  -1.64*  Federalism (FEDERAL, 1 = 
federal)  (0.98) (0.88) (0.93) (0.91) (0.96) (0.99) (0.96) 
0.11 0.51 1.07 0.95 0.18 0.99 0.77  OECD-Membership (OECD, 1 = 
OECD-Member)  (2.12) (2.25) (2.16) (2.10) (2.21) (2.23) (2.10) 
2.59**  2.47* 2.44* 2.25* 2.24* 2.57*  1.98  Form of Government (PRES, 1 = 
presidential system)  (1.29) (1.23) (1.20) (1.24) (1.24) (1.29) (1.26) 
2.85*** 2.53*** 2.61***  2.38**  2.69*** 2.61*** 2.52***  Electoral system (MAJ, 1 = 
plurality rule)  (0.96) (0.88) (0.94) (0.92) (0.87) (0.90) (0.83) 
0.51*  1.04  1.03  1.42 1.03** 0.40 1.40**  Direct Democracy measure (see 
above)  (0.31) (0.77) (0.97) (1.01) (0.40) (0.66) (0.58) 
Constant  -21.62 -17.45 -18.00 -17.95 -18.64 -18.50 -18.01 
               
Adjusted R²  0.47  0.39  0.38 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.42 
SER  2.22 2.35 2.37 2.35 2.32 2.40 2.30 
Jarque-Bera Value  2.48  2.13 2.45 2.39 1.70 2.44 2.14 
Hausman-Test  (p-value)  0.45        
Observations  42 45 45 45 45 45 45 
*, ** und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses are the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. The Hausman-Test draws on the 
instruments latitude, school enrollment, age of democracy, share of catholic population and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. 
 
The table shows that mandatory referendums seem to increase the budget surplus 
(by 1.35% of GDP). Yet, this effect is not robust to the inclusion of the control 
variables. However, as soon as those countries that introduced direct democratic 
institutions only after 1996 are excluded, the coefficient becomes 2.20. The 
standard error being .66, this implies de jure mandatory referenda are significant 
on the 5% level (with N=40). Returning to the complete sample, inclusion of the   26
control variables changes the picture once again: now, the right to initiative has a 
significant positive effect on the budget surplus (namely 2.1%). Moving on to the 
variables that could have a direct effect, we see that both (the number of factually 
held) mandatory referendums and initiatives reduce the budget deficit. Both of 
these results are robust to the inclusion of the Z-vector. The regression with the 
DDI also indicates that stronger direct democratic institutions are correlated with 
lower central government budget deficit deficits. The economic significance 
seems to be substantial too: Every two-step improvement of direct democracy 
(remember that there are seven groups) goes along with a reduction of the central 
government budget deficit of more than one percentage point. 
To conclude our analysis of the effects of direct democratic institutions on fiscal 
policy variables, we ask whether they have an effect on the composition of 
government spending measured by the variable social services and welfare 
spending. The variable is defined as the central government expenditures 
consolidated on social services and welfare as a percentage of GDP. Since our 
estimates show that they do not (at least for the entire sample), we refrain from 
presenting yet another table.19 
 
Government Effectiveness 
We now turn to the estimates that deal with the effect of direct democratic 
institutions on government effectiveness. The measure for government 
effectiveness is taken from the Governance Indicators of the World Bank 
(Kaufmann et al. 2003) and has been recoded here such that 10 indicates the 
highest level of government effectiveness. Additionally, we also analyze the 
effects of direct democratic institutions on tax morale and a measure called graft 
which is also taken from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators. Since the 
“graft” measure is a proxy for corruption, we checked the robustness of the results 
by regressing Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index” on the 
direct democracy variables. 
We do not find an indirect effect of direct democratic institutions on government 
effectiveness. But there is a direct effect: the factually held number of mandatory 
                                                 
19   When the “weak democracy” dummy is interacted with the possibility of optional referendums, it 
shows that countries that have that institution spend 3.3% less on social services and welfare than 
countries without it. This result is due to the indirect effect as no optional referendums took place 
in weak democracies between 1996 and 2005.   27
referendums as well as the DDI is positively correlated with government 
effectiveness (table 7).20 When a variable is used that asks people whether 
cheating on taxes is justified, a very similar picture emerges. The variable is based 
on a question of the World Values Survey (“Please tell me for each of the 
following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in between: …. Cheating on tax if you have the chance [% 
“never justified” code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1= never and 10 = always]).  
Table 7: Direct Democracy and Government Effectiveness 
Dependent Variable: 
GOVEF9604  Direct Democracy measure used 
Independent Variables 








1.08 0.67 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.56 
Age of Democracy (AGE, 0-1) 
(0.61) (0.58) (0.58) (0.56) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) 
1.10*** 1.04*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 1.04*** 1.00***  GDP per capita 1990 in log form 
(LYP)  (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) 
0.01** 0.01**  0.01*  0.01*  0.01** 0.01** 0.01**  Sum of Exports and 
Imports/GDP (TRADE)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 
Population in log form (LPOP) 
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
0.02*  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01*  0.01*  Primary and Secondary school 
enrollment (EDUGER)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
0.60 0.62 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.70  OECD-Membership (OECD, 1 = 
OECD-Member)  (0.45) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.42) 
0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 -0.13 -0.16  Federalism (FEDERAL, 1 = 
federal)  (0.30) (0.32) (0.35)  0.33  (0.32) (0.32) (0.30) 
0.65 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.54 0.61 0.57  Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(AVELF)  (0.64) (0.49) (0.49) (0.54) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***  Percentage of protestants in 
1980 (PROT80)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
0.35*  0.31** 0.30** 0.31** 0.28** 0.29** 0.30**  Gastil-Index (GASTIL, 1-7, 7 = 
highest degree of freedom)  (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
-0.34 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.35 -0.33  Form of government (PRES, 1 = 
presidential)  (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
1.51**  1.37* 1.36* 1.36* 1.39* 1.39* 1.39*  Share of directly elected 
legislators (PIND)  (0.59) (0.77) (0.76) (0.76) (0.79) (0.76) (0.76) 
-1.24*  -1.18 -1.16 -1.16 -1.15 -1.17 -1.15  Inverse of district magnitude 
(MAGN, Districts / Seats)  (0.71) (0.86) (0.86) (0.86) (0.89) (0.85) (0.83) 
0.94* 0.00 -0.10 -0.08 0.24* 0.09  0.32  Direct Democracy measure (see 
above)  (0.60) (0.22) (0.33) (0.37) (0.12) (0.29) (0.19) 
Constant 15.23  -5.88  -5.97  -5.98 -6.02 -5.81 -5.66 
               
Adjusted R²  0.87  0.87  0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.88 
                                                 
20   In “weak democracies”, a higher number of factually held mandatory referenda actually reduces 
government effectiveness.   28
SER  0.76 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.72 
Jarque-Bera Value  7.48  11.59*** 9.48**  9.72** 11.37***  12.41***  11.66*** 
Hausman-Test  (p-value)  0.47        
Observations  56 64 64 64 64 64 64 
*, ** und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses are the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. The Hausman-Test draws on the 
instruments latitude, school enrollment, age of democracy, share of catholic population and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. 
Japan and Venezuela are outliers. Excluding the outliers does not change the results but improves the J-B.-value. 
It has been argued that direct democratic institutions improve the process of 
political decision-making and would hence improve the legitimacy of political 
decisions. If that hypothesis were correct, more direct democracy should be 
correlated with a lower propensity to cheat on taxes. Out of the seven variables 
estimated, this is again the case with regard to mandatory referendums and the 
DDI. The result is again robust to the inclusion of the control variables. Neither 
optional referendums nor initiatives display any significant effect on tax morale as 
they do on government efficiency.  
Differences in direct democratic institutions are not capable of explaining 
differences in the level of corruption either measured by the variable graft 
(Kaufman et al. 2003) or the NGO Transparency International’s “Corruption 
Perception Index”. This is why the tables are not presented here.21 
Productivity 
We finally deal with the relationship between direct democracy and productivity. 
The effects on both labor and total factor productivity are, however, largely 
insignificant. This is why only one table referring to total factor productivity is 
presented here (table 8).22 
All in all, the economic effects of direct democratic institutions are less 
pronounced than in the intra-country studies. We have identified effects on both 
fiscal policies and government effectiveness, but these effects do not translate into 
effects on labor or total factor productivity. 
The results presented here can also be interpreted as a contribution to the debate 
on the economic effects of democracy in general. It has been argued (e.g. by Barro 
2000) that democratic (as opposed to autocratic) government does not increase a 
                                                 
21   It is, however, remarkable that the interaction effect between “weak democracies” and the number 
of factually held initiatives indicates that more initiatives are correlated with higher levels of 
corruption (not in table either). 
22   The interaction effect between  “weak democracies” and the number of factually held initiatives 
shows that more initiatives are correlated with higher labor productivity.   29
country’s growth rate. If direct democracy is conceived of as a means to increase 
the democracy level compared to systems that are purely representative, then we 
can say something about the question whether increasing the level of democracy 
is correlated with increases in growth and income. Table 8 seems to say that this is 
not the case. These results also contribute to the issue whether broad deliberation 
leads to higher levels of growth: factually using direct democratic institutions 
induces a discourse on the entire citizenry, yet, it does not seem to have growth-
enhancing effects. 
But the evidence is not strong enough to dismiss direct democratic institutions 
right away. Quite to the contrary: it is remarkable that direct democratic 
institutions have, on average, stronger effects in weak democracies. And this is 
not confined to their direct effect, but is also true for their indirect effect. This 
seems to indicate that passed a certain level of development, the economic effects 
of direct democracy begin to decrease. It will be important to further inquire into 
the underlying reasons. 
Table 8: Direct Democracy and Total Factor Productivity 
Dependent Variable: 
LOGA2000  Direct Democracy measure used 
Independent Variables 








-0.06 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.21 
Age of Democracy (AGE, 0-1) 
(0.33) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) 
0.20** 0.19** 0.18** 0.19** 0.20** 0.19** 0.19**  Openness Frankel/Romer 
Gravity Model (FRANKROM)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
0.43 0.66 0.64 0.64  0.76*  0.69 0.74  Standardized Difference From 
Equator (LAT01)  (0.48) (0.51) (0.53) (0.52) (0.44) (0.49) (0.49) 
0.08 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10  % of Population with English as 
First Language (ENGFRAC)  (0.29) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) 
-0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06  % of Population with European 
Language (EURFRAC)  (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
0.67*** 0.74*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.70***  OECD-Membership (OECD, 1 = 
OECD-Member)  (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) 
0.30*  0.29**  0.27*  0.28** 0.30** 0.29** 0.29**  Federalism (FEDERAL, 1 = 
federal)  (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
-0.64*  -0.78** -0.75** -0.74** -0.74** -0.76** -0.73**  Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization (AVELF)  (0.33) (0.33) (0.38) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) 
-0.00  -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*  -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00*  Percentage of protestants in 
1980 (PROT80)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06  Gastil-Index (GASTIL, 1-7, 7 = 
highest degree of freedom)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
0.13 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19  Form of government (PRES, 1 = 
presidential)  (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Share of directly elected  0.64**  0.59*  0.54  0.54  0.57* 0.57* 0.57*   30
legislators (PIND)  (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) 
-0.55 -0.41 -0.35 -0.34 -0.39 -0.38 -0.38  Inverse of district magnitude 
(MAGN, Districts / Seats)  (0.35) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) 
0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10  Direct Democracy measure (see 
above)  (0.43) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
Constant  7.92 8.16 8.12 8.09 8.10 8.12 8.07 
               
Adjusted R²  0.55  0.56  0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 
SER  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Jarque-Bera Value  2.00  1.94 2.61 2.58 1.95 2.27 2.37 
Hausman-Test  (p-value)  0.39        
Observations  54 58 58 58 58 58 58 
*, ** und *** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses are the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. SER is the standard error of the 
regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. The Hausman-Test draws on the 
instruments latitude, school enrollment, age of democracy, share of catholic population and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.  
 
6  Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper is the first attempt to analyze the effects of direct-democratic 
institutions on a cross-country basis. The results of prior intra-country studies that 
have focused on the analysis of Switzerland and the U.S. are only partially 
confirmed. Direct democratic institutions have an impact on fiscal policy 
variables, especially the budget surplus and on government efficiency. With 
regard to the institutional details, the results are primarily driven by mandatory 
referendums and the direct effect (the de facto frequency of use) is generally 
stronger than the indirect effect (the de jure norm). The dominant effect of 
mandatory referendums provides some evidence for the conjecture that broad 
initiative rights could lead to more government spending whereas the institution 
of (fiscal) referendums could cause the exact opposite (Bodmer 2004). Since it 
matters how often the various direct democratic institutions are factually used, it is 
important to remember the factors determining their use, also identified in this 
paper (by looking at bivariate correlations). These factors are entirely in line with 
our conjectures: factual use will be higher the longer the institutions have been in 
place, the fewer the number of policy areas excluded from direct democracy, the 
higher the number of policy areas that need to hold (mandatory) referendums, the 
lower the number of signatures needed and the lower the quorum that needs to be 
met for the result to become binding. With regard to policy implications, all these 
factors are therefore relevant institutional details that could be influenced by 
governments to increase the impact of direct democracy. 
All this can only be a first step into what promises to become an exciting research 
area. Our results show that institutional detail matters. It would, hence, be   31
desirable to take even more institutional detail explicitly into account. It would 
also be desirable to further increase the number of explicitly recognized countries, 
in particularly those in Africa. Another question that seems to be worth pursuing 
is whether the kind of revenues (taxes vs. user charges and other non-tax receipts) 
gathered by governments are also determined by the degree of direct democracy 
realized in a country. 
References 
Adserà, A., C. Boix, and M. Payne (2001); Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality 
of Government. Working Paper no. 438, Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
Alm, J. and B. Torgler (2005); Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in 
Europe, mimeo. 
Alt, J.and D. Lassen (2003); The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States. 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 5(3):341-65. 
Banks (2004): CROSS-NATIONAL TIME-SERIES DATA ARCHIVE, 1815-2003 [electronic 
resource]. Binghamton, NY: Databanks International. 
Benz, M. and A. Stutzer (2004); Are voters better informed when they have a larger say in politics? – 
Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland, Public Choice 119:31-59. 
Blomberg, S, G. Hess and A. Weerapana (2004); The Impact of Voter Initiatives on Economic 
Activity. European Journal of Political Economy , 20(1),  207-26. 
Blume, L, J. Müller, S. Voigt and Chr. Wolf (2007); The Economic Effects of Constitutions: 
Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2017, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985682. 
Bodmer, F. (2004); Why Direct Democracy could not stop the Growth of Government in Switzerland 
during the 1990’s, Discussion Paper, Centre for Business and Economics, University of Basle. 
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962); The Calculus of Consent  - Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy, Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press. 
Elazar, D. (1995); From statism to federalism: a paradigm shift, Publius 25(2), 5-18. 
Feld, L. and G. Kirchgässner (2001). The Political Economy of Direct Legislation: Direct Democracy 
and Local Decision-Making. Economic Policy. 33:329-63. 
Feld, L. and J. Matsusaka (2003); Budget referendums and government spending: evidence from Swiss 
cantons, Journal of Public Economics 87:2703-24. 
Feld, L. and M. Savioz (1997). Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical 
Investigation. Kyklos 50(4):507-38. 
Feld, L. and S. Voigt (2003); Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence 
using a new set of indicators, European Journal of Political Economy: 19(3), 497-527. 
Fiorino, N. and Ricciuti, R. (2007): Determinants of Direct Democracy, CESifo Working Papers No. 
2035, Category: Public Choice, June 2007.   32
Freedom House (2000); Press Freedom Survey 2000, downloadable from: 
http://freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/method.html    
Frey, B. (1994). Direct Democracy: Politico-Economic Lessons from Swiss Experience. American Eco-
nomic Review 84(2):338-42 
Frey, B. and A. Stutzer (2000); Happiness, Economy and Institutions, The Economic Journal ,110: 918 - 
938.  
Frey. B. and A. Stutzer (2006). Direct Democray: Designing a Living Constitution, forthcoming in: R. 
Congleton (ed.): Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy - Analysis and Evidence, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2006. 
Hwang, J.-Y. (2005). Direct Democracy in Asia: A Reference Guide to the Legislation and Practice. 
Taiwan Foundation for Democracy Publication. 
Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (2005b); Guidebook to Direct Democracy, Amsterdam. 
Kaufmann, B. (2004): Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (2005a); Initiative & Referendum 
Monitor 2004/2005. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2003). "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 
for 1996-2002".  World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper. 
Kirchgässner, G. and Frey, B. (1990). Volksabstimmung und direkte Demokratie: Ein Beitrag zur Ver-
fassungsdiskussion, in: H.D Klingmann and M. Kaase (eds.): Wahlen und Wähler - Analysen aus Anlaß der 
Bundestagswahl. Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen, 42-69. 
Lipset, S. M. (1960); Political Man: The Social Basis of Modern Politics, New York: Doubleday. 
Madronal, J. C. (2005). Direct Democracy in Latin America. Mas Democracia and Democracy 
International. 
Matsusaka, J. (1995); Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the last 30 years. Journal of 
Political Economy 102(2):587-623. 
Matsusaka, J. (2000); Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, 
Journal of Law & Economics 43:619-50. 
Matsusaka, J. (2004); For the Many or the Few. The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Matsusaka, J. (2005); Direct Democracy Works, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2):185-206. 
Matsusaka, J. and N. McCarty (2001); Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter 
Initiatives, The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 17(2):413-48. 
Mueller, D. (2003); Public Choice III; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say?, 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Pommerehne, W. (1983); Private vs. öffentliche Müllabfuhr: Nochmals betrachtet. Finanzarchiv 41:466-
75. 
Pommerehne, W. (1990). The Empirical Relevance of Comparative Institutional Analysis. European 
Economic Review 34:458-68 
Riker, W. (1964); Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston: Little Brown.   33
Roubini, N. and J. Sachs (1989); Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the 
Industrial Democracies, European Economic Review 33: 903-38. 
Seddon, J., A. Gaviria, U. Panizza, and E. Stein (2001); Political Particularism around the World. 
Stanford University, Stanford. 
Smith, D. and C. Tolbert (2004); Educated by Initiative. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Tavares, J. and R. Wacziarg (2001); How democracy affects growth, European Economic Review 45:1341-
78. 
Treisman, D. (2000); The causes of corruption: a cross-national study; Journal of Public Economics 76, 
399-457. 
Veenhoven, R. (2004); World Database of Happiness, Catalog of Happiness in Nations, downloadable from: 
http://www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness, last assessed on Sep 20, 2004. 
World Values Study Group (2004); World Values Survey 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1995-1997, and 1999-
2001. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor. 
 
Appendix 1: 
Criteria on which IRI Europe’s Country Index by Kaufmann (2004) is based: 
Very fundamental elements: Exclusions on issues, entry hurdles, time limits, majority 
requirements/quorums, the way signatures are collected. 
Fundamental elements: Role of parliament, finances and transparency, supervision 
Important elements: Periods of time, additional tools of direct democracy 
Useful elements: Support by administration, communicative infrastructure, intermediate results remain 
undisclosed. 
 
The seven categories of the country-rating: 
The Radical Democrats: Citizens have access to a broad spectrum of direct-democratic procedures. As 
well as the binding popular initiative, these include the right of facultative referendum and obligatory 
referendums for alterations to the Constitution and state treaties. 
The Progressive: Citizens have, at least in part, the possibility of initiating national referendums 
without the express permission of the organs of the state (parliament, government, president). There 
are also procedures for obligatory referendums. 
The Cautious: The electorate does have practical experience of popular initiatives and /or national 
referendums. But these procedures are essentially plebiscitary in nature, i.e. they are not protected or 
controlled by the citizens themselves or by the law, but are controlled “from above” by parliament 
(political parties) or by the executive. 
The Hesitant: The political elites in the countries of this category appear to be afraid of popular 
participation in political decision-making, whether out of fear of having to share power or because of 
concrete historical experiences. Even here, however, there are still some traces of statutory I&R 
procedures, which may form the basis for future improvement   34
The Fearful: Almost entirely lacking institutional procedures and practical experience, the countries in 
this category make it very hard for themselves to complement indirect democracy. In addition, the 
political and cultural circumstances scarcely provide a stimulus for the introduction or the 
strengthening of elements of popular decision-making. Nonetheless, the issue is occasionally debated. 
The Beginners: These countries have only recently started their democratization process, including a 
respect for basic freedoms and human rights. Parliaments have been elected by the people, but there is 
still a great deal of mistrust between governments and governed, making the introduction of 
additional instruments like direct democracy extremely difficult. 
The Authoritarians: In the countries belonging to this category, there is at present no basis at all for 



























































































































































































































Afghanistan  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0          0 0
Argentina  2  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1     1        0 0
Armenia  1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 11
Australia  6 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1      0 1 100 106
Austria  5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 86
Azerbaijan  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0      1 2 2 4 11
Bangladesh  2  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0              0 2
Belgium  5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0          0 0
Bhutan  1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0              0 0
B o l i v i a   1   0   000000000               0 0
B r a z i l   2   0   000000001               0 0
Brunei  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0          0 0
B u l g a r i a   5   0   000000001               0 0
Cambodia  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0          0 0
Canada     0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  1  1        0 0
C h i l e   2   0   000000001      1         0 0
China  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0          0 0
Colombia  3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 9 15
C o s t a  R i c a   1   0   100000001         5   0 0 4
Cyprus (Greek)  3  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1              0 0
Czech Republic  5  1  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0              3 4
Denmark  6  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1        5  2 86 86
Dominican Rep.    0   000000000               0 0
East Timor    0  000000001  0  0           0 0
Ecuador  3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 8
E l  S a l v a d o r   2   1   000000000            1 0 6
Estonia  4  1  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1        3  1 3 14
Finland  4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1          0 0
F r a n c e   5   0   000000001               0 0  35
Georgia  2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1      4 0 0 11
Germany  4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1          0 0
Greece  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0          0 0
Guatemala  2  1  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1        0  1 12 21
G u y a n a      1   000000000         0   12 83 6
H o n d u r a s   1   0   000000001               0 0


























































































































































































































Iceland  3  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1        0  2 0 62
India  4  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0              0 0
Indonesia  1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0              0 0
I r e l a n d   6   1   008300001         0   16 98 4
Italy  6 0 1 0 0 0 6 3 0 0 1 1 1 3 3 32 59
Japan  4  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     1        0 59
Kazakhstan  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0          0 0
Kyrgyzstan  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13
Laos  1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0              0 0
Latvia  5 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 9 2 3 15
Liechtenstein     0 1 1 0 0 5 2 4 2 1 0 1 0 0 81 85
Lithuania  6 1 1 1 3 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 14 14
Luxembourg  5  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1              0 0
M a l a y s i a   1   0   000000000               0 0
M a l d i v e s   2   0   000000001               0 0
Malta  4  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0        0  1 0 42
Mexico  1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0              0 0
Mongolia  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0          0 0
M y a n m a r      0   000000000               0 0
Nepal  1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0              0 0
N e t h e r l a n d s   6   0   000000001               0 0
New  Zealand  6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 112 112
Nicaragua  1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1              0 0
N o r t h  K o r e a      0   000000000   0   0         0 0
N o r w a y   5   0   000000001      1         0 0
Pakistan  1  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1              0 0
Panama  2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 29 34
Paraguay  3  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0        6  1 0 14
Peru  3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1 0 13
Philippines  6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      1 1 1 71 19
P o l a n d   5   0   000000001               0 0
P o r t u g a l   5   0   000000001               0 0
Romania  4  1  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1        3  1 3 15
Singapore  1  1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0           2 0 11
Slovakia  6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 1 3 1 12 14
Slovenia  6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 2 1      1 0 0 10 15  36
South  Korea  4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0          44 19
Spain  5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1      1 0 28
Sri  Lanka  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1      0 1 24 6
S w e d e n   5   0   000000001               0 0
Switzerland  7 1 1 1 17 3 22 3 19 3 1 1 1 0 3 158 158
Taiwan  4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1      1 4 2 0 12


























































































































































































































T h a i l a n d   1   0   000000001               0 0
Turkey  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0          0 0
Turkmenistan  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1      1 0 0 0 14
United Kingdom  4  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0  0        0 0
Uruguay  5  1  1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0        1  1 89 94
U S A      0   000000000   1   1         0 0
Uzbekistan  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0          0 0
Venezuela  3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1      1 3 1 0 7




Many variables used in this paper are based on Persson and Tabellini (2003, PT) 
or Blume, Müller, Voigt, and Wolf (2007, BMVW).  
AGE: 
Age of democracy defined as AGE = (2000 – DEM_AGE) / 200, with values varying between 0 
und 1, source: PT and BMVW. 
AGE_CONST: 
Year in which the current constitution was passed; source: Blume and Voigt (2006) and the 
sources cited there. 
AVELF: 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly 
fractionalized) averaging five sources; sources: PT and BMVW. 
DE_FACTO_JI: 
Factual independence of the judiciary; values between 0 and 1 with 1 signalling a high level of 
factual independence; source: Feld and Voigt (2003). 
DEM_AGE: 
First year of democratic rule in a country, corresponding to the first year of a string of positive 
yearly values of the variable POLITY for that country that continues uninterrupted until the end of 
the sample, given that the country was also an independent nation during the entire time period. 
Does not count foreign occupation during WW II as an interruption of democracy; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
COMMLAW:   37
Dummy for common law legal origin, coded 1 if legal origin is common law, coded 0 if legal 
origin is any other. 
EDUGER: 
Total enrollment in primary and secondary education as a percentage of the relevant age group in 
the country’s population, based on values for 1998 and 1999; sources: PT and BMVW. 
ENGFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks English as a native language; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
EURFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks one of the major languages of Western Europe: 
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanisch; sources: PT and BMVW. 
FEDERAL: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has a federal political structure, 0 otherwise; sources: PT 
and BMVW. 
FRANKROM: 
Natural log of tradeshare forecasted by Frankel and Romer’s gravity model of international trade 
which takes both a country’s population and its geographical location into account; sources: PT 
and BMVW. 
GASTIL: 
Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights, each index is measured on a 1-to-7 scale 
with 1 representing the lowest degree of freedom. Countries whose averages are between 1 and 2.5 
are called “not free”, those between 3 and 5.5 “partially free” and those between 5.5 and 7 as 
“free”; sources: PT and BMVW. 
GOVEF 9604: 
Government effectiveness according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank. Combines 
perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single indicator. Values between 0 
and 10, where higher values signal higher effectiveness; average values for 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002, and 2004; sources: PT and BMVW. 
HAPPINESS: 
Happiness according to happiness surveys collected by Veenhoven 2004 and arranged on a 10-0-
scale with higher values signalling higher happiness. 
INIT_DEBT: 
Initial endebtment of a country as a share of its GDP in the first year for which data was available 
(INIT_DEBT = (Domestic Debt + Foreign Debt)/GDP); source: International Monetary Fund 
(2006): International Financial Statistics Online Service. 
LAT01: 
Rescaled variable for latitude, defined as the absolute value of LATITUDE divided by 90 and 
taking on values between 0 and 1; sources: PT and BMVW. 
LOGA 2000: 
Natural logarithm of total factor productivity, calculated for the year 2000 on the basis of a Cobb-
Douglas-Function following the model of Hall & Jones (1999); source: BMVW. 
LPOP: 
Natural logarithm of total population (in millions); sources: PT and BMVW. 
LYP: 
Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant dollars (chain index) expressed in 
international prices, base year 1985; average for the years 1990 – 1999; sources: PT and BMVW. 
MAGN: 
Inverse of district magnitude, defined as DISTRICTS / SEATS. MAGN is a measure for the 
degree of political competition and can take on values between 0 and 1. Small values of MAGN 
indicate a high degree of political competition; sources: PT and BMVW.   38
MAJ: 
Dummy variable for electoral systems, equal to 1 if all the lower house in a country is elected 
under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered; sources: 
PT and BMVW. 
OECD: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 for all countries that are members of the OECD; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
PIND: 
Computed as 1 – LIST / SEATS; can take on values between 0 and 1. PIND indicates the 
proportion of individually elected candidates (i.e. those not on a party list); sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
PRES: 
Dummy variable for government forms, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 otherwise. Only 
regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in 
power (even if an elected president is not chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are 
included among presidential regimes Most semipresidential and premier-presidential systems are 
classified as parliamentary source: constitutions and electoral laws; source: PT and BMVW. 
PRESS-FREEDOM: 
Takes on values between 0 and 100; in countries coded between 0 and 30, the press is called 
„free“, 31-60 as „partially free“ and 61-100 „not free“; source: Freedomhouse at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274. 
PROP1564: 
Percentage of a country’s population between 15 and 64 years old among entire population; 
sources: PT and BMVW. 
PROP65: 
Percentage of a country’s population over the age of 65 in the total population; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
PROT80: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing the Protestant religion in 1980 (younger states 
are counted based on their average from 1990 to 1995); sources: PT and BMVW. 
SPL: 
Central government budget surplus (if positive) or deficit (if negative) as a percentage of GDP, 
based on  „DEFICIT (-) OR SURPLUS“ as share of GDP average for 1990-1999; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
SPROPN: 
Share of legislators in a country elected in national (secondary or tertiary) districts rather than 
subnational (primary) electoral districts; source: PT 
TOTEXP: 
Total government expenditure as share of GDP. 
TRADE: 
Sum of exports plus imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
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